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Fabrizio Di Mascio  
  
Patronage in Italy:  






Italy constitutes a crucial case for the investigation into changes of patronage practices in 
contemporary democracies.  According to Kopecky and Scherlis (2008), the so-called Italian “First 
Republic” was in fact a paradigmatic case of the diffusion of “bureaucratic clientelism” 
characterised by: a) the distribution of an enormous quantity of posts at all levels of the 
administration, and; b) the presence of reward as the dominant motivation behind political 
appointments. 
Bureaucratic clientelism is held to occur in South European systems which share historical 
developments that have produced administrative systems distinct from the Weberian ideal type. 
Administrative organisation and behavior have been shaped by the Napoleonic tradition widely 
diffused in Southern Europe (Peters 2008). The emphasis on state power over the role of society 
that distinguishes Napoleonic tradition conforms to the role of the State in Southern societies of 
“assisted capitalism” (Sotiropoulos 2004). The State in Italy has traditionally promoted economic 
development through strategies and instruments (protectionism, transfers, subsidies, control of 
industries) used in a very particularistic fashion. The long-term dependence of the Italian weak 
bourgeouisie on the State has prevented distributional particularism from being reviewed by the 
rise of Weberian administrative structures (Amato 1979).  
An administrative system with low institutional capacity, affected by multiple organisational and 
functional contradictions, has thus resulted from historical development (Cassese 1993). The 
Italian system has long displayed the features typical of the prevalent southern European 
bureaucratic model: a) patronage at the bottom, clientelistic patterns in the recruitment of low-
ranking officials; b) formalism and legalism complemented by informal shadow governance 
structures; c) uneven distribution of resources, institutional fragmentation and insufficient 
mechanisms for policy-coordination; e)  absence of a typical European administrative élite 
(Sotiropoulos 2004).  
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An administrative elite equipped with an esprit de corps has never formed due to the lack of highly 
selective recruitment channels. The Italian administrative elite has been described as an “ossified 
world” (Cassese 1999) elderly and with little professionalisation, where promotions were rewards 
for age and length of service, without horizontal and vertical mobility, dominated by the formalism 
of personnel almost exclusively trained in law. The low level of professionalism allowed the top 
ministerial bureaucracy to form a pact of reciprocal self restraint with politicians. The pact was 
based on the exchange between job security and political power: bureaucrats renounced an 
autonomous and pro-active role in processes of policy-making, while parties refrained from 
interfering in the management of careers – the primary preoccupation of a bureaucracy gone 
„southern‟, characterised by a patrimonial conception of public service, dedicated to administrating 
itself rather than the country. The roots of the exchange between job security and political power 
can also be traced back to the key features of the old “polarized pluralism” (1947-1992): tripolar 
centrifugal competition and centre occupied by the DC that made any total alternation in power 
impossible (Sartori 1976). Due to the low average duration of unstable coalitions, ministers did not 
have the time to gain control of their departments, nor had they the motivation to do so in such a 
short-term perspective.  
“Patronage at the top”, a key feature of Southern systems, has not been extensive in the ministerial 
domain, while it has flourished in the Italian parallel administration, “a complex and probably 
unique mélange of parastatal bodies, public agencies and public corporations” (Golden 2003, 202), 
marked by increasing extension and plurality of organisational models. Parties have pursued a 
strategy of colonisation (Sartori 2005) by penetrating via party-nominated appointees all spheres of 
Italian society which came under full control of, or largely dependent upon, the parties‟ 
organisational networks entrenched within an overgrown public sector.  
The deep colonisation of an “available State” (Di Palma 1979) constituted the condition for the 
affirmation and reproduction of partitocrazia, a regime at first characterised by the substantial 
monopoly of parties over political activity and, later, by the progressive expansion of their power 
into the social and economic spheres (Pasquino 1995). The legitimacy deficit of the Italian 
democracy has been compensated by the organisational strength of its political parties which 
dominated the political system (Morlino 1998). The weakness of public bureaucracies, the 
interventionist tradition of the State in the economic sector, and the necessity to mantain the 
precarious consensus for a regime affected by exclusive legitimation, have thus conferred 






Between party system change and administrative reforms: Italy as a transitional context 
 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s changes in the international environment shook the foundations of 
partitocrazia: the end of the two bloc system of international relations sanctioned the definitive 
erosion of the bases of systemic polarisation that had determined electoral and governmental 
alliances;  the parties in government also saw the growth of constraints imposed by the process of 
European integration on the irresponsible particularistic distribution of material resources (Cotta 
1996). The exhaustion of ideological polarisation and material public resources, which had fed 
competition among the old parties, accentuated the turbulence in the internal environment. 
International changes facilitated the launching of challenges to partitocrazia by various actors that 
provoked the increasing destructuration of parties and the party system. Between 1992 and 1994, 
“atomisation” was reached, characterised by exceptional fluidity and uncertainty as much in party 
organisations as in their systemic interactions (Di Virgilio 2006).  
It was in 1994 that a new process of consolidation of the party system began. The introduction of 
new electoral laws as a majoritarian institutional arrangement precipitated the collapse of the old 
parties and stimulated the consolidation of a new set of competitive interactions. The party system 
had undergone a radical transformation: most of the parties participating in the 1994 election were 
either brand new or had been affected by a profound change. The party system has assumed the 
features of “fragmented bipolarism” (D‟Alimonte 2005). Systemic atomisation has been overcome 
thanks to a new two-level system composed not only of parties but also of pre-electoral coalitions. 
The alternation in government between pre-electoral coalitions has become the new predictable 
structure of competition (Cotta and Verzichelli 2000). If pre-electoral coalitions have provided for 
the re-freezing of the party system, the single party organisations have remained thawed, as 
demonstrated by the party supply, incessantly re-modelled by fissions and fusions of party labels. 
Atomisation has been overtaken by change in the party system, but this has left a legacy of crisis 
among parties as organisations with scarce or absent levels of institutionalisation. The nature of 
governmental coalitions is still fragmented and heterogenous, heightened by the uncertainty of a 
system where only the bipolar mechanics has been stabilised while the format has remained 
subject to fluidity.  
The collapse of the old parties, that have been unwilling to modify a dysfunctional bureaucratic 
machine, created a unique window of opportunity for administrative reforms that profoundly 
reshaped three dimensions of the Italian State (Lewanski 1999; Natalini 2006). The first dimension 
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is the substantial retreat from direct intervention and entrepreneuship in the economy in favour of a 
regulatory role. Independent autorithies have been created to regulate liberalised markets, while 
privatisation processes have radically reduced the size of the State and reorganised the remaining 
public enterprises into shareholder companies controlled by Treasury.  
Up to the late 1980s Italy had one of the largest state-owned sectors among Western economies: 12 
out of the 20 largest non financial companies were state-owned and 90 per cent of financial 
investment was provided by state controlled banks. The turning point came in 1992 when a public 
finance and currency crisis materialised. Privatisation in Italy produced the second highest 
revenues in Europe after the UK. Real progress has been made since the mid-1990s in reducing the 
debt-to-GDP ratio which amounted to 124.8 per cent in 1994. Privatisation was a main component 
of the restrictive budget policy pursued in order to meet the criteria to join the EMU. Between 
1995 and 2000 the government spending as percentage of GDP fell from 52.5 to 46.2. Nonetheless, 
Italy still has one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratio which amounted to 105.8 per cent in 2008 
(EUROSTAT).  
The second component of the process of reform is the change in the organizational structure of 
central administration: organisational flexibility has increased, taking a large share of the 
regulation of the administrative machinery away from the Parliament and into the hands of the 
executive in order to implement a permanent policy of organisational rationalisation (Lupo 2003); 
public management reform reinforced powers and responsibilities of senior executives in 
administrative management; the increase in the autonomy of public managers has been balanced 
by the growth of ministerial discretion in the awarding of fixed term contracts to senior executives 
who lost tenured positions.  
The third dimension of the reshaping of the Italian State is the reform of subnational government: 
legislative powers and administrative functions have been decentralized; subnational executives 
have been reinforced thanks to institutional reforms that introduced semi-parliamentary forms of 
government; subnational executives acquired wide regulatory powers over subnational 
administrative structures; enhanced organisational flexibility has led to a sharp growth in the 
number of local disaggregated institutions.  
After reforms, local governments represent a larger share of total expenditures (31.3%) than they do 
for revenues (19.1%), and finance 54.3 per cent of these expenditures through grants/transfers 
(OECD). The share of total government staff employed at central level is still high and it amounted 
to 58 per cent in 2008. Government employment in Italy as a share of the total labour force 
amounted to 14.7 per cent in 2007 (Torchia 2009). The corporatisation of governments in periphery 
has created a wide semi-public sphere composed of local enterprises which amounted to 4874 units 
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in 2005 (Citroni 2009). The universe of local corporations is the expanding semi-public appendage 
of the already fragmented galaxy of Italian public institutions shown by Table 1.   
 







THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The empirical analysis that follows proposes to ascertain how far the radical changes of the 1990s 
have affected the diffusion, logic and mechanisms of patronage. The analysis aims to fill a gap in 
the greater part of the literature, which continues to associate Italy with the old patronage practices 
that developed in a political-administrative context overturned by the crisis of the 1990s.  
For each policy sector five experts have been interviewed, leading to a total of 45 interviews. 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of interviews. Respondents have a varied background: from top 
civil servant, politicians and academics, to journalists and other specialists with deep knowledge in 
policy sectors under investigation. 
- Figure 1 About Here - 
 
Compared to the practices of bureaucratic clientelism of the old partitocrazia, the political and 
administrative changes of the 1990s have altered: i) the diffusion of patronage at the central level 
of government, which has clearly shrunk because external policy constraints have narrowed the 
State‟s hold on the economy and reduced the extent of party penetration; ii) the mechanisms for 
forming bonds of trust between politicians and appointees, which are no longer governed by party 








The scope of political appointments: Range and depth 
 
 
Patronage is still pervasive in the Italian public sector. The analysis of formal opportunities for 
patronage practices reveals the high susceptability of Italian public bodies to party influence over 
the distribution of positions. Political appointments are actually allowed by the legal framework for 
most institutional types of all policy sectors and parties make use of existing opportunities to fill in 
positions with political appointees. The only institutional sub-type that remains formally unaffected 
by patronage is the executing level for the Judiciary.  
Table 2 presents the Index of Patronage scores. Ministerial Departments are the institutional type 
where patronage is more pervasive. It is followed by Non-Departmental Agencies and Commissions 
and Executing institutions which remain less penetrated by patronage practices.  
- Table 2 About Here - 
 
Data on the range and depth of patronage offer a more differentiated picture of patronage across 
institutional types and policy sectors. Table 3 highligths that range values are rather high at the 
central level of government. Scores are extremely high in Ministries and NDAs. Lower but still 
relevant is the width of patronage in Executing Institutions which is due to the presence in this 
institutional sphere of impermeable organisations operating in policy sectors such as Judiciary, 
Education, Military, Foreign Services and the Military.  
- Table 3 About Here - 
 
The relevance of political influence is very low in the judicial offices because distribution of posts 
is doled out among the organised factions of the magistracy. Associated magistracy exploits its own 
quantitative and qualitative power at the heart of the CSM, the Judiciary‟s self-governing body, 
which is the repository of the formal power of nomination. The legal framework makes less 
permeable the Education and Culture sector, where the complexity and rigidity of formal 
recruitment procedures protect the public school system from political interference. The strictly 
hierarchical organisational structure contributes to maintaining substantially impenetrable executing 
institutions in the Military and Police sector, such as the Armed Forces and the Fire Brigade, both 
of which are composed of professional bodies that privilege technical-bureaucratic rather than 
political criteria in internal career paths. The motivation valid for the Armed Force also hold for the 
Ministry of Defence, the only ministerial institution to remain unaffected by patronage. The 
strength of corps makes political penetration particularly difficult in military institutions where 
seniority and bureaucratic solidarity are the guiding criteria in the awarding of posts. The low range 
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of the executing institutions of the Foreign Affairs sector is motivated by the low strategic salience 
of many of these institutions (consulates and a large share of embassies), which leads parties to 
concentrate their efforts on a few organisations (permanent representations, embassies and institutes 
of culture that operate with strategic partners) that require a strict congruence between the policy 
orientations of the executive and administrative action. In the Financial sector, finally, the Bank of 
Italy continues in its tradition of impermeability thanks to the complexity of its institutional 
mission, which requires the awarding of posts according to strictly merit-based criteria.  
Table 4 shows that the depth of patronage does vary across the institutional spheres. The depth of 
patronage decreases in extra-ministerial domains at the central level of government. Political 
appointments tend to be restricted to the top level of disaggregated institutions.  
- Table 4 About Here - 
 
According to the experts, the professionalisation of intermediate and lower levels is a condition 
necessary for the functional autonomy of organisations that have been disaggregated from the 
ministries in order to operate efficiently in turbulent environments. Limiting politicisation to top 
positions allows disaggregated institutions such as IRAs and SOEs to conserve the high levels of 
organisational flexibility necessary to remain connected to dynamic transnational networks of 
economy and governance.  
The analysis of the scope of patronage shows that Italian parties cast an extensive net of political 
appointments over the fragmented administration that is more dense in the ministerial centre. 
Patronage is more pervasive in ministerial departments because of the complexity of policy 
coordination performed by these institutions that organise flows of communication between 
different policy sectors, different levels of government, and between the State and social actors 
(Media and organised interests).  
As can be seen in Figure 2, subnational administrations stand out as the heartland of patronage in 
contemporary Italy.  
- Figure 2 About Here - 
 
Parties can reach all institutions at the subnational level of government. The maximum score of 
range highlights the pervasiveness of local patronage that has been reinforced by the sharp increase 
in the number of disaggregated institutions. Parties have taken advantage of the opportunities that 
the expansion of subnational administration offered to fill with political appointments at all levels 
extra-ministerial organisations created from scratch. Moreover, the adoption of the enterprise 
formula in the regional healthcare systems has not succeeded in depoliticising local healthcare 
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authorities which constitute arena of massive party rent-seeking. Subnational governments lacks 
professional bodies as hindrance to patronage expansion, since they do not operate in policy sectors 
characterised by established career paths.  Besides professional reasons, it must be noted that feeble 
pressures by the EU for the liberalisation of local public service markets allowed subnational 
governments to extend their hold over local economies, using corporatization in order to increase 
the sphere of particularistic exchange which, at the local level, and especially in Southern Italy, is 




Logic and mechanisms of patronage 
 
For most intervieews, political appointments are made primarily for controlling public institutions. 
Figure 3 highlights the prevalence of control over reward. Reward was never cited as the single 
motivation behind patronage. Regardless of the high score for “Both Reward and Control”, control 
appears to be much more predominant than reward.  
- Figure 3 About Here - 
The logic of patronage in Italy is mainly guided by the desire to allow party governors to control the 
processes of policy-design and implementation and the flow of public resources in all sectors of the 
central administration. Parties nominate loyal individuals to top strategic positions (senior 
executives, board members, public corporation managers) in order to render the administrative 
structures more responsive to changes in policy priorities.  
Patronage as control at the top is pervasive, and has not been eradicated by the administrative 
reforms that aimed to rationalise the functioning of the State. The reforms reduced the scope of 
patronage at the top through processes of privatisation, but they did not trigger a paradigm change.  
Administrative reforms were rather used as strategies for enhancing the flexibility of political 
control over the administration through the introduction of fixed-term contracts for top positions 
and the frequent reorganisation of public institutions. The permanent policy of rationalisation of 
administrative structure provoked an expansion of patronage. Both coalitions used arguments for 
rationalisation as an excuse for distributing new positions. Parties in government have transformed 
the flexibility of the legal framework into an instrument that creates room for manoeuvre in the 
allocation of administrative positions.  
Control of the administration has not only remained widespread, it has become even thicker. The 
swarms of policy advisors and consultants that crowd ministerial cabinets offering specific 
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expertise, flexible support and unconditional loyalty in the development of policies have expanded.  
The growth of ministerial cabinets as centres of power and communication in the machinery of 
government increases the imbalance between political control and professional policy advice that 
marks Italy, where ministers avoid the rigidity of bureaucracies through informal mechanisms of 
politicisation that allow a faster and more penetrating control of public institutions. 
The exception to the prevalence of control over reward is the Regional and Local Administration 
sector, where experts have underlined the equal importance of the two motivations. The relevance 
of patronage as reward in this sector is confirmed by the fact that Regional and Local 
Administration has the highest scores for depth of patronage. Experts have pointed to the continued 
relevance of patronage as a mode of clientelistic exchange of votes for public posts at lower levels, 
particularly in the south of Italy where local administrative bodies continue to serve as social shock 
absorbers
1
. Patronage as a reward for the participation of activists otherwise inactive is however 
widespread in Regional and Local Administrations. 
The picture changes at the national level. As highlighted by the scores on the depth of patronage, in 
the central administration the clientelistic offer of jobs is now residual. Parties continue to play a 
role in the recruitment of lower level employees in some  executing institutions of the economic 
sector, for example the Postal Services, but such interventions have been defined as marginal by 
experts. Patronage as a reward at the national level is therefore restricted to the supply of top 
positions and intermediate managerial posts to activists and professional politicians, but 
nevertheless to a lesser extent than seen in subnational bodies.  
The ministerial sphere is a particularly relevant one for patronage as reward, allowing parties to 
offer their supporters positions in ministerial cabinets and intermediate bureaucratic positions open 
to parties‟ friends appointed as “in-and-outers”. The boards of disaggregated organisations, 
particularly in the executing institutions of the Economy (SOEs) and Culture and Education 
(Research bodies and companies of the Ministry for Cultural Heritage), constitute the other group of 
institutions that provide a great many positions for distribution as rewards. To this group must be 
added RAI (the public service broadcaster), infiltrated at all levels in order to reward activists and 
professionals of parties as campaign organisations (journalists and media consultants).  
The prevalence of strategies of control in appointment processes affects the criteria parties use when 
selecting appointees. To occupy strategic positions that control resources crucial in processes of 
policy-making, parties are obliged to select individuals with at least a modicum of expertise. As can 
be seen in Figure 4, the professional competence of appointees is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for exercising control over the State.  
- Figure 4 About Here - 
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Parties select appointees that are not only competent, able to manage processes of policy-making, 
but also loyal, ready to guarantee the responsiveness of institutions to party instructions. Parties 
recruit personnel that combine expertise and loyalty both to design and implement policy change 
and to control the particularistic distribution of services – patronage in the widest sense – to their 
own supporters. 
Only candidates that have cultivated a network of personal relations connecting them to party actors 
are able to obtain a status as trustworthy and obtain positions. Public managers are no longer 
recruited through parties as organisations but are nominated by single party actors that draw on their 
personal networks embedded in the professional worlds (the public sector, the private sector, 
academia). The format of the party system affected the formation of links of trust between 
professionals and parties, as shown by the low values for political links in Italy. After the crisis of 
polarised pluralism, catch-all coalitions composed of numerous and fluid parties have alternated in 
government in Italy. The fragmentation and instability of the format of the Italian party system, 
resulting from the absence of consolidated loyalties towards the new parties, increases the role of 
personal ties in the patronage practices of new parties as pro tempore clusters of office holders 
gathered in catch-all blocs. 
Experts underlined the collapse of political link as the most important qualification of the 
appointees. In the old polarised pluralism patronage practices guaranteed the deep segmentation of 
public institutions according to their political colours: the role of parties as organisations was 
relevant in covering all levels of positions entrusted to personnel chosen according to their partisan 
loyalty. In the new bipolar system patronage has been trasformed into a device for the personalised 




The personalisation of patronage is best defined by investigating the actors that control selection 
processes. The relevant role of ministers, who monopolise patronage in ministerial departments and 
control a large share of patronage in agencies and advisory bodies for respective areas of 
competence, emerges sharply. The ministers with the widest networks of appointments are those for 
Health, Finance, and Cultural Heritage, who are able to control most of the institutions in their 
sectors. The institutions most open to the influence of actors other than the sector‟s ministers are the 
executing institutions (SOEs in the Economy sector, RAI in the Media sector, Research Bodies in 
the University sub-sector) and nonmajoritarian institutions (the Constitutional Court and the CSM 
in the Justice sector, Independent Authorities in the Economy and Media sectors) that are subject to 
the division of positions among the leaders of the coalition. The relevance of “ministers” and 
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“leaders” in political appointment processes makes it difficult to mantain the distinction between 
organisational and governmental leadership because “the whole leadership of the „new‟ Italian party 
system has been recruited directly at the top of government without leaving their party 
responsibilities” (Verzichelli 2009, 86).  
The extreme personalisation of patronage has prevented managers from being organised in two 
compact enemy camps, despite the advent of the bipolar party system. The process of creating 
personal networks takes place in two phases: in the first phase each party governor gathers around 
her/him in her/his own personal entourage loyal expert collaborators from the sector of interest; in 
the next phase it is the single experts of that entourage to explore their own personal networks in 
search of trustworthy managers to whom a position may be given. Party governors therefore acquire 
the control of institutions through networks largely composed of nodes borrowed from the 
functional networks of their own closest collaborators. Experts have underlined the “loneliness” of 
party governors, who practice patronage without either close links or support from party 
organisations, and the ability of appointees, skilful in reaching those trusted by leaders through 
personal connections. The intermediation/input of the parties as organisations is missing. Experts 
remarked that parties as organisations play no role in processes of appointment dominated by 
solitary governors. The personal-functional rather than the organisational logic that informs the 
creation of networks also determines their fluidity: the pragmatism that dominates allows nodes 
with less intense relations with leaders to skip from one network to the next, activating their own 
personal connections that lead to both of the alliances alternating in government 
 
 
Majoritarian and consensual patronage practices 
 
The rather high value of “Jobs for the opposition” in Figure 5 is due to the presence of the practice 
of dividing positions between the government and opposition, concentrated in the sectors: Media, 
Justice, Military and Police, and Regional & Local Administration. 
- Figure 5 About Here - 
 
In the Justice and Media sectors the distribution of positions in non-ministerial institutions among 
the actors of the party system is proportional with a correction for the majority. Consensual 
patronage practices are institutionalised by the legal framework that assigns the power of 
nomination to the Parliament as the arena of cooperation between the majority and the opposition. 
In the Justice sector the majority reserves 5 CSM posts and 3 constitutional judges for itself, 
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assigning 3 CSM posts and 2 constitutional judges to the opposition. In the Media sector there is an 
equal division of positions on the AGCOM (Independent authority) board, 4 each, while the 
government reserves the choice of the President of the Authority, who enjoys wide powers in 
directing the organisation. In the RAI 5 members of the board are assigned to the majority and 4 to 
the minority, including the President. The majority select the CEO of the Company, and the top 
management positions of the 2 principal television networks, while the third network is marked by 
the prevalent and constant influence of the centre-left coalition. At the intermediate and lower levels 
stability prevails and the division of areas of influence among the parties resists changes in the 
government. 
The collaboration mechanisms between government and opposition are different in the Military and 
Police sector. Cooperation between the two coalitions takes place in the specific sub-sector of 
Interior and Police and assumes the form of the sharing rather than the division of appointments. 
The majority enjoy the power of proposal, while the opposition evaluate the government‟s 
proposals and may veto candidates they consider incapable of offering adequate guarantees of 
impartiality. The sharing of the power of appointment between government and opposition is owed 
to the peculiarity of the sector which controls the administration of elections (Interior) and manages 
public order (Police). The common interest in the equality of the civil and political rights that feed 
the democratic process push government and opposition to consult one another so as to choose 
personnel loyal to both of them.  
In other sectors of the central level of administration clear cut spoils system mechanisms prevail. 
The bipolar structure of competition creates strong pressures towards majoritarian patronage 
practices. The wholesale alternation in government urges coalitions to acquire exclusive control of 
posts considered strategic. In regional and local administration, the opposition have easier access to 
positions. This is particularly the case in the south of Italy because of the extreme fragmentation of 
party systems, characterised by the balkanisation of an extremely personalised representation. In 
Southern Italy parties are not even able to fulfil the procedural role of expression and support for a 
government. Southern executives lacking a coherent parliamentary base offer patronage 
opportunities to individual members of the opposition in order to build coalitions of variable 
geometry that ensure their precarious stability. In central and northern Italy, on the other hand, more 
structured party systems reinforce the control of the majority over sub-national administrations. In 
these areas of the country the opposition is excluded from selection processes for candidates for 
strategic positions, but do have stable access to numerous positions on boards of agencies and in 
local public utilities. 
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Evolution of patronage practices over time 
 
The collapse of the party system between 1992-1994 and the wave of administrative reforms of the 
1990s brought considerable discontinuity to the patronage practices along many of the analytical 
dimensions examined in the project as shown in table . 
- Table 5 About Here - 
 
As far as the role of parties in policy sectors is concerned, the clear decline of political control over 
the Justice sector should be underlined. In the past cooperation between old parties in processes of 
appointment allowed them to exploit the internal divisions within the associated magistracy. Old 
parties were able to influence the selection of magistrates with whom they had formed strong ties. 
The advent of a strongly polarised party system on judicial issues has provoked a rupture in 
practices of exchange between coalitions. New parties are no longer able to qualitatively increase 
their quantitative weakness in the CSM through the old consensual arrangements which have been 
undermined by fierce polarisation
3
.  
As far as the role of parties in different types of institutions is concerned, the traditional relevance 
of party control over “parallel administrations” (agencies and executing institutions) remains, a 
typical trait of the old partitocrazia. The politicisation of ministries has grown with the introduction 
of reforms inspired by New Public Management. The temporary nature of positions has served to 
ensure the loyalty more than the accountability of senior executives. Contracts are extended or 
managers are promoted not on the basis of their performance but on the relationship of trust they 
manage to establish with political leaders that distribute positions without any procedural curbs on 
their discretion. Patronage in ministerial departments has become a new control mechanism over 
policy implementation alternative to the old hierarchical supremacy of the government undermined 
by processes of functional and structural disaggregation. The old “ossified world” of the top civil 
service has become a “liquid world” where the precariousness of posts and career progression has 
generated the individualisation of offers of temporary loyalty to ministers of the moment. An 
indicator of the politicisation of ministries is the growth of senior executive positions as percentage 
of ministerial personnel. Between 1994 and 2007, the ratio increased from 1.8 to 2.3 (Torchia 
2009), propelled by various legislative interventions of successive governments which have 
enlarged the quota of posts to be awarded to those from outside ministerial settings, and extended 
the quota of top positions to be awarded via the promotion of lower-level managers. In addition, the 
length of contracts has been reduced.  
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Patronage as reward tends to shift to ministries, while in the First Republic it was concentrated in 
the executing institutions, particularly in the Economy sector. This difference in the localisation of 
patronage as reward is just one of the aspects of the profound change that has been observed in the 
executing institutions of the Finance and Economy sectors. Europeanisation and globalisation have 
not only notably reduced the extension of the perimeter of the public sector, they have also caused a 
qualitative change in patronage practices in the executing institutions, now shareholder companies 
that remain either wholly or partly publicly owned. The Treasury, as the only shareholder of public 
shares in these companies, has concentrated the management powers of publicly run companies, at 
one time spread out, with the intention of guaranteeing a coherent direction for all the decisions 
regarding public companies, and of contributing to the recovery of public finances by increasing the 
value of shares remaining in public hands.  
The formal changes in the architecture of power over public institutions has contributed to the 
transformation of negotiations between parties over the division of positions.  In the First Republic 
the dispersion of formal powers of appointment among multiple institutions gave a formal 
translation to deeply institutionalised practices of dividing positions, known as lottizzazione. The 
old parties and factions obtained posts in institutions invested with the power of appointment and, 
consequently, in the companies controlled by them, in proportion to their electoral strength and 
strategic position in the coalition. These practices were possible because old parties both could and 
preferred, irresponsibly, to finance the inefficiency of public companies. Enterprises and economic 
bodies were managed by professionals chosen on the basis of their political links and possessing the 
only professional quality sufficient for procuring abundant resources that hidden professionals, 
nominated at high and intermediate levels,  arranged to distribute to clients, groups and hidden 
donors. 
The budget constraints that centralised the formal powers of appointment in the head of the 
Treasury have made the division practices of the Second Republic much more unstable with respect 
to the old lottizzazione.  The President of the Council of Ministers and the Minister for Finance 
have become the dominant actors in that: a) they dispose of the power to direct and control 
companies; and  b) they represent the government in supranational organisations. Controlling 
information flows between markets and supranational institutions, government and public 
companies, the President and the Minister for Finance claim and acquire the lion‟s share of top 
management posts, thwarting the requests from allied party leaders for a more or less proportional 
distribution of positions during coalition bargaining. The President of the Council has extended his 
own sphere of influence to other important policy-making arenas such as the Intelligence Units in 
the Military and Police sector and the Securities Regulator in the Finance sector. In the Foreign 
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Affairs sector a diarchy of the Minister and the President tends to appear, who compete with each 
other for control over patronage. 
The changed global economic-financial context has undermined the role of patronage as an 
instrument for the mass organisational consolidation of parties through the extraction of resources 
from economic agencies. After the financial crisis of the Italian State and entry into the single 
currency, patronage has been transformed into an instrument for the connection of leaders and 
shareholder companies through the selection of top managers with professional qualification 
ensuring efficient management. There has been a retreat in patronage at the top levels: few hidden 
professionals and clients remain since resources to distribute have become scarce. Companies have 
become more professional at the lower and intermediate levels in order to adapt efficiently to the 
competitive pressures of globalised markets.  
The restructuring of the central level of administration, the changes in the party system and the 
introduction of the direct election of heads of local executives have brought noticeable changes to 
the actors that control the expansion of patronage at the local level. Local executives have become 
dominant actors while in the past the national leaders of the Dc and the local party organisations of 
the Pci prevailed. In the Dc it was the role of pyramidal factions, networks of vertical exchange 
through which resources from agencies and public companies flowed from centre to periphery, that 
made local office holders weak and dependent on national leaders (Zuckerman 1979). The current 
scarcity of resources at the centre, the expansion of functions and resources for sub-national 
administrations, and the disappearance of the permanent control of the State by the Dc as the 
dominant party, have greatly weakened the strength of factional connections.  
The legitimacy provided by the direct election of mayors and regional presidents and the clear 
reinforcement of executive power over administrative organisation have further weakened the 
factional links. Party system change facilitated the growth of local post-communist governors no 
longer controlled by a mass party that disappeared after the fall of communism. Members of the 
party in government at the subnational level have now autonomous control of patronage to satisfy 
local party networks. The Head of the Executive has become the dominant actor in subnational 
patronage processes. However, the rise of the subnational Presidents does not mean the ability to 
monopolise the distribution of positions, since there is competition from ministers seeking to extend 
their own networks from local ministerial departments to disaggregated administrations. In the new 
stratarchical configuration of Italian parties, subnational bosses offer the national leaders, who 
dispense patronage at the central level, an organisational base in exchange for lack of interference in 
the implantation of their local committees fed by public resources.  
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CONCLUSIONS: A matter of governmentness 
 
The empirical analysis reveals the persistent hold of parties on the Italian administration, while at 
the same time highlighting a clear cut discontinuity in the new parties‟ control mechanisms over the 
State.  The wave of administrative and institutional reforms and the party system change prevented 
the return of colonisation as a specific mode of politicising the Italian administration which allowed 
the formation and reproduction of partitocrazia. The extraordinary collapse of old parties and the 
reshaping of the State in the 1990s demolished the two most characteristic traits of the partitocratic 
colonisation: continuously expanding scope and the clear pre-eminence of political links as a 
criterion in the selection of administrative elites by party organisations. 
As far as the diffusion of patronage is concerned, the hypothesis on the fall of clientelism in 
affluent societies is confirmed (Kitschelt 2007).  In the Italian case of comprehensive clientelism it 
was the crisis of old patterns of political competition that allowed the competitive pressures of the 
new global context of political economy to affect the State. The pressures of new global 
governance met with no resistance from organisational networks abandoned by parties in the 
process of disbanding. The exceptional break in the party system opened a window of opportunity 
for the technocratic elites that had guided the country‟s entry into Europe by restructuring the State 
(Sbragia 2001). The new economic constitution, arising from processes of privatisation and 
liberalisation, constituted an exogenous constraint for the new parties, whose patronage practices 
had to adapt to the culture of macro-economic stability institutionalised by membership of the 
European Union (Radaelli 2002). The more streamlined State, integrated in transnational economic 
institutional networks, prevented the reproduction of the inflationary tendencies of clientelism.  
The study of patronage in Italy reveals the presence of organisational dynamics typical of parties in 
new democracies. Such a discovery is unsurprising if we understand the crisis of the 1990s as a 
regime crisis (Pasquino 2002) that allowed new parties lacking institutionalised mechanisms for 
coordinating the different functional arenas to enter government. As happens in new democracies, 
the concentration of power in the small nucleus of leaders straddling the roles of party in 
government and party executive acts as a cohesion-seeking strategy, compensating for the deficit 
of political loyalty in transitional contexts (Biezen 2005). Personal loyalties take the place of 
procedures such as mechanisms of party integration. The leaders become the only face of the party, 
since they control the distribution of the institutional resources that form the cement for fluid 
organisations.  
Personalisation of patronage in Italy is an indicator of the under-institutionalisation of new parties 
subordinated to the personal power of the leaders. The organisational weakness of the new parties 
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in government has placed them in a position of dependence with respect to members of the cabinet 
in the management of patronage. In personalising patronage, governors not only reinforce the 
policy making capacity of the cabinet, but above all they consolidate their power base through 
access to material public resources that are manipulated in order to feed the private networks that 
support their political activity
4
. As happens in new democracies, in Italy “political personalities 
make use of parties for their own ends, rather than act as the leaders of collective organisations of 
political actions” (Webb and White 2007, 359). With the new democracies, Italy shares both the 
generational factors of new parties that are governing without having first institutionalised their 
own organisational infrastructure, and the weakness of the public administration from which the 
private networks of leaders extract resources.  
The unbearable financial weight of the “party governmentness” (Katz 1986) that characterised the 
partitocrazia has been replaced by the unbearable organisational lightness of the governmentness 
of new parties. Weak parties constitute an appendage of the personal power of their leaders in 
government. Patronage practised by new parties alternating in government has exacerbated the 
dysfunctions of the administrative systems still lacking strong interinstitutional linkages and 
networks that make a substantial contribution to policy coherence and effective public 
management (Torchia 2009). Patronage in Italy cannot guarantee an efficient link between parties 
and the system of governance, since responsible policy coordination requires procedures and 
institutionalised networks of communication rather than personal loyalties
5
. 
According to Katz, in advanced democracies the political party “becomes a label by which a group 
of leaders is known and an organization for coordinating elite activity” (Katz 1990, 146). The party 
that no longer fulfils representative functions in society becomes an integrated network of office 
holders, a stable organisational structure of the governmental process within the State. The absence 
of institutionalisation renders Katz‟s definition invalid for the new Italian parties. The new Italian 
parties are only able to fulfil the “labelling function” typical in cases of atomisation in the party 
system. 
The new organisations can only be defined as parties in the sense of Sartori‟s minimal definition, 
that is political groups identified by an official label that present at elections and are capable of 
placing through elections candidates for public office. As Sartori (1976) notes, this definition pays 
no attention to organisational requirements. In this definition the only cohesive element required is 
the label that gathers stable coalitions of office-holders and candidates. For Sartori (2005, 15-16), 
“before the advent of the mass parties it proper to speak of „parties‟ (as stabilised coalitions of 
leaders) but not of the party system (as being a structured system)”. Western European systems 
have been structured by the rise of the mass party which “resides in the linkage, in the fact that the 
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party is made of its connecting network. The mass party may well remain loose and thus resemble 
a federation. Still, its costituent units are no longer persons but impersonal agencies; that is, the 
leaders are no longer above the party” (Sartori 2005, 15). As underlined by the turnover in party 
affiliations, which made the political offer particularly fluid after the crisis of pluralised polarism, 
leaders in Italy have returned to being above the parties. The infrastructure of the new 
organisations is not the institutionalised connecting network left by the mass parties to the cartel 
parties in stable systems. It was instead personal power that took the place of the connecting 
network in a context of systemic atomisation in which the party could not stay above the leaders, 
in the sense that “the party both outlasts its leaders and binds them to its logic of inertia” (Sartori 
2005, 12). 
As new organisations that emerged after the exceptional crisis of the old system, Italian parties can 
only function as labels, coalitions of leaders incapable of structuring the actions of elites within 
governmental institutions through procedural mechanisms. It is the leaders who control the process 
of building parties that prosper as vehicles for professionals who use electoral success for personal 
profit (Lawson 2007). Rather than a devise that strengthens pre-existing party networks (Ware 
1996), patronage can only strengthen Italian leaders. Old parties colonisation-oriented built 
extensive networks in a pervasive public sector as systems of organisational occupancy of the 
Italian society. Contemporary political leaders build new parties as labels cemented by institutional 
resources that feed private networks.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 On the long life of clientelism in Southern Italy, see Caciagli (2006). 
 
2
 The patronage practices of the Northern League constitute the only exception to the dominant pattern. As a populist 
party the Northern League have met with considerable difficulties in recruiting top managers, since professionals have 
never offered their services to a party perceived as “not respectable”.  
 
3
 For a more detailed overview of the reduction of the politicisation of judicial offices see Guarnieri (2003). The 
quantitative weakness of parties is a result of the political control over only 1/3 of the members of the CSM.   
 
4
 As a result, corruption remains systemic but parties as agents of coordination and centralised protection of hidden 
exchanges have declined (Della Porta and Vannucci 2007).    
 
5
 The investigation of the Italian case confirms the difficulties of governing efficiently and effectively for new parties in 
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State (Ministries, Prime Minister‟s Office, Fiscal Agencies, Constitutional Bodies) 31 
Research Bodies 44 
Economic Bodies (Independent Administrative Authorities, Economic activities regulatory 
bodies, Economic service producers, other bodies) 
36 
Institutions providing cultural services and assistance 61 
Total Central Government 172 
Regions and Autonomous Provinces 22 
Provinces 104 
Municipalities 8101 
Producers of Health Services at Local level 283 
Economic bodies at Local level 436 
Institutions providing Education, Cultural Services and Assistance at Local level 553 
Other bodies 769 
Total Local Government 10268 
Social Security Funds 27 
TOTAL 10467 
 






Table 2: Scope and Reach of Patronage, by Policy Area and Institutional Types  
 




Economy 0,67 0,33 0,33 0,44 
Finance 0,67 0,22 0,22 0,37 
Judiciary 0,67 0,33 0,11 0,37 
Media 0,67 0,33 1,00 0,67 
Military and Police 0,33 0,33 0,11 0,26 
Healthcare 0,67 0,33 0,33 0,44 
Culture and Education 0,67 0,33 0,22 0,41 
Foreign Services 0,67 0,00 0,11 0,39 
Regional and Local 
Administration 0,67 1,00 1,00 0,89 











Table 3. Range of Patronage, by Policy Area and Institutional Types 
 
 
Policy Area Ministries NDAC Executing 
Institutions 
Policy Area Total 
Economy 3 3 3 1,00 
Finance 3 2 2 0,78 
Judiciary 3 3 1 0,78 
Media 3 3 3 1,00 
Military and Police 1.5 3 1 0,61 
Healthcare 3 3 3 1,00 
Culture and Education 3 3 2 0,89 
Foreign Services 3 n.a. 1 0,67 
Total Central Level 0,94 0,95 0,67 0,85 
Regional and Local 
Administration 
3 3 3 1,00 




Table 4. Depth of Patronage, by Policy Area and Institutional Types 
 
Policy Area Ministries NDAC Executing 
Institutions 
Policy Area Total 
Economy 2 1 1 0,44 
Finance 2 1 1 0,44 
Judiciary 2 1 1 0,44 
Media 2 1 3 0,67 
Military and Police 2 1 1 0,44 
Healthcare 2 1 1 0,44 
Culture and Education 2 1 1 0,44 
Foreign Services 2 n.a. 1 0,50 
Total Central Level 0,67 0,33 0,42 0,48 
Regional and Local 
Administration 
2 3 3 0,89 












Table 5: The Evolution of Patronage over time, Patterns 
 
Sectors From consensual arrangements to polarisation:  
Decline of control over Judicial Offices 
Institutional Types Bipolarism and NPM reforms:  
Expansion of patronage in the ministerial domain  
Range Restructuring of the administrative system:  
Decline at Central level (privatizations), Expansion at Local level (corporatization) 
Depth Patronage in retreat under pressures from transnational networks: 
From deep segmentation to control of top management in extra-ministerial domains 
Logic More Control; Less Clientelism;  
Reward still significant, particularly at local level 
Mechanisms Collapse of Political Link and Rise of Personalisation; Growth of Head of the 
Executive‟s influence at all levels; Territorialization of subnational patronage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
